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Abstract
Building reliable storage systems becomes increas-
ingly challenging as the complexity of modern storage
systems continues to grow. Understanding storage fail-
ure characteristics is crucially important for designing
and building a reliable storage system. While several re-
cent studies have been conducted on understanding stor-
age failures, almost all of them focus on the failure char-
acteristics of one component – disks – and do not study
other storage component failures.
This paper analyzes the failure characteristics of stor-
age subsystems. More speciﬁcally, we analyzed the stor-
age logs collected from about 39,000 storage systems
commercially deployed at various customer sites. The
data set covers a period of 44 months and includes about
1,800,000disks hostedin about155,000storage shelf en-
closures. Our study reveals many interesting ﬁndings,
providing useful guideline for designing reliable stor-
age systems. Some of our major ﬁndings include: (1)
In addition to disk failures that contribute to 20-55%
of storage subsystem failures, other components such as
physical interconnects and protocol stacks also account
for signiﬁcant percentages of storage subsystem failures.
(2) Each individual storage subsystem failure type and
storage subsystem failure as a whole exhibit strong self-
correlations. In addition, these failures exhibit “bursty”
patterns. (3) Storage subsystems conﬁgured with redun-
dantinterconnectsexperience30-40%lower failure rates
than those with a single interconnect. (4) Spanning disks
of a RAID group across multiple shelves provides a more
resilient solution for storage subsystems than within a
single shelf.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Reliability is a critically important issue for storage
systems because storage failures can not only cause ser-
vice downtime, but also lead to data loss. Building re-
liable storage systems becomes increasingly challenging
as the complexity of modern storage systems grows into
an unprecedented level. For example, the EMCTM Sym-
metrix DMX-4 can be conﬁgured with up to 2400
disks [8], the GoogleTM File System cluster is composed
of 1000 storage nodes [9], and the NetApp R   FAS6000
series can support more than 1000 disks per node, with
up to 24 nodes in a system [12].
To make things even worse, disks are not the only
component in storage systems. To connect and access
disks, modern storage systems also contain many other
components, including shelf enclosures, cables and host
adapters, and complex software protocol stacks. Failures
in these components can lead to downtime and/or data
loss of the storage system. Hence, in complex storage
systems, component failures are very common and criti-
cal to storage system reliability.
To design and build a reliable storage system, it is cru-
cially important to understand the storage failure charac-
teristics. First, accurate estimation of storage failure rate
can help system designers decide how many resources
should be used to tolerate failures and to meet certain
service-level agreement (SLA) metrics (e.g., data avail-
ability). Second, knowledge about factors that greatly
impact the storage system reliability can guide designers
to select more reliable components or build redundancy
intounreliablecomponents. Third,understandingthesta-
tistical properties such as failure distribution over time of
modernstoragesystemsisnecessarytobuildrighttestbed
and fault injection models to evaluate existing resiliency
mechanisms and to develop better fault-tolerant mecha-
nisms.
While several recent studies have been conducted on
understandingstoragefailures,almostallofthemfocused
on the failure characteristics of one storage component—
disks. For example, disk vendors have studied the
disk failure characteristics through running accelerated
life tests and collecting statistics from their return unit
databases [4, 21]. Based on such tests, they calculate
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speciﬁcation. For most of the disks, the speciﬁed MTTF
is typically more than one million hours, equivalent to a
lower than 1% annualized failure rate (AFR).B u ts u c h
low AFR is usually not what has been experienced by
users. Motivated from this observation,recently some re-
searchershavestudieddiskfailuresfromauser’sperspec-
tive by analyzing disk replacement logs collected in the
ﬁeld [14, 16]. Interestingly,they founddisks are replaced
much more frequently (2-4 times) than vendor-speciﬁed
AFRs. But as this study indicates, there are other storage
subsystem failures besides disk failures that are treated
as disk faults and lead to unnecessary disk replacements.
Additionally, some researchers analyzed the characteris-
tics of disk sector errors, which can potentially lead to
complete disk failures [2], and they found that sector er-
rorsexhibitstrongtemporallocality(i.e.,burstypatterns).
While previous works provide very good understand-
ingofdiskfailuresandaninspiringstartingpoint, it is not
enough since, besides disks, there are many other com-
ponents that may contribute to storage failures. With-
out a good understanding of these components’ failure
rates, failure distributions, and other characteristics, as
well as impacts of these component failures on the stor-
age system, it can make ourestimation of the storage fail-
ure rate/distribution inaccurate. For example, as we will
show in our study from real-world ﬁeld data, having a
lower disk failure rate does not necessarily mean that the
corresponding storage system is more reliable—because
some other components may not be as reliable.
More importantly, if we only focus on disk failures
and ignore othercomponentfailures, we may fail to build
a highly reliable storage system. For example, RAID is
usually the only resiliency mechanism built in to most
modernstoragesystems(variousformsofchecksumming
are considered as part of RAID). As RAID is mainly de-
signed to tolerate disk failures, it is insufﬁcient to handle
other component failures such as failures in shelf enclo-
sures, interconnects, and software protocol layers.
While we are interested in failures of a whole storage
system, this study is concentrated on the core part of it
— the storage subsystem, which contains disks and all
components providing connectivity and usage of disks to
the entire storage system.
We conducteda study using real-world ﬁeld data from
Network ApplianceTMAutoSupport Database, to answer
the following questions:
• Howmuchdodiskfailurescontributetostoragesub-
system failures? What are other major factors that
can lead to storage subsystem failures?
• What are the failure rates of other types of stor-
age subsystem components such as physical inter-
connects and protocol stacks? What are the failure
characteristics such as failure distribution and fail-
ure correlation for these components?
• Typically, some resiliency mechanisms such as
RAID and redundancy mechanisms such as multi-
pathing are used in practice to achieve high relia-
bility and availability [5, 9]. How effective are these
mechanismsin handlingstorage subsystemfailures?
Data from the same AutoSupport Database was ﬁrst
analyzed in [2] on latent sector errors and was further
analyzed in [3] on data corruptions.
There are other redundancy and resiliency mecha-
nisms in storage system layers higher than the storage
subsystem and RAID-based resiliency mechanism stud-
ied in this paper. These mechanisms handle some of the
storage subsystem failures. Studying impacts of these re-
siliency and redundancymechanisms on storage failures,
including storage subsystem failures, is part of the future
work.
1.2 Our Contributions
This paper analyzes the failure characteristics of stor-
age subsystems, including disks and other system com-
ponents, based on a signiﬁcant amount of ﬁeld data col-
lectedfromcustomers. Speciﬁcally,weanalyzedthestor-
age logs collected from about 39,000 storage systems
commercially deployed at various customer sites. The
data set covers a period of 44 months and includes about
1,800,000 disks hosted in about 155,000 storage shelf
enclosures. Furthermore, our data covers a wide range
of storage system classes, including near-line (backup),
low-end, mid-range,a n dhigh-end systems.
This paper studies failure characteristics from sev-
eral angles. First, we classify storage subsystem failures
into four failure types based on their symptoms and root
causes and examine the relative frequencyof each failure
type. Second, we study the effect of several factors on
storage subsystem reliability. These factors include disk
models, shelf enclosuremodels, and network redundancy
mechanisms. Finally,we analyzethestatistical properties
of storage subsystem failures, including the correlation
between failures and their time distribution.
Ourstudy revealsmanyinterestingﬁndings,providing
useful guideline for designing reliable storage systems.
Following is a summary of our major ﬁndings and the
corresponding implications:
• In addition to disk failures that contribute to 20-
55% of storage subsystem failures, other compo-
nentssuch asphysicalinterconnects(includingshelf
enclosures) and protocol stacks also account forsig-
niﬁcant percentages (27-68% and 5-10%, respec-
tively) of failures. Due to these component failures,
even though storage systems of certain types (e.g.,
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than some other types (e.g., near-line backup sys-
tems), their storage subsystems exhibit higher fail-
ure rates. These results indicate that, to build highly
reliable and available storage systems, only using
resiliency mechanisms targeting disk failures (e.g.,
RAID) is not enough. We also need to build re-
siliency mechanisms such as redundant physical in-
terconnects and self-checking protocol stacks to tol-
erate failures in these storage components.
• Each individual storage subsystem failure type and
storage subsystem failure as a whole exhibit strong
correlations, (i.e. after one failure, the probability
of additional failures of the same type is higher).
In addition, failures also exhibit bursty patterns in
time distribution, (i.e. multiple failures of the same
type tend to happenrelatively close together). These
results motivate a revisiting of current resiliency
mechanisms such as RAID that assume independent
failures. These results also motivate development of
better resiliency mechanisms that can tolerate multi-
ple correlated failures and bursty failure behaviors.
• Storage subsystems conﬁgured with two indepen-
dent interconnects experienced much (30-40%)
lower AFRs than those with a single interconnect.
This result indicates the importance of interconnect
redundancyinthedesignofreliablestoragesystems.
• RAID groups built with disks spanning multiple
shelf enclosures show much less bursty failure pat-
terns than those built with disks from the same shelf
enclosure. This indicates that the former is a more
resilient solution for large storage systems.
Therest ofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. Section2
providesthe backgroundand describes our methodology.
Section3presentsthecontributionofdiskfailurestostor-
age subsystem failures and frequency of other types of
storage subsystem failures. Section 4 quantitatively ana-
lyzes the effects of several factors on storage subsystem
reliability, while Section 5 analyzes the statistical prop-
erties of storage subsystem failures. Section 6 discusses
the related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper and
provides directions for future work.
2 Background and Methodology
In this section, we detail the typical architecture of
storage systems, the deﬁnition and terminology used in
this paper, and the source of the data studied in this pa-
per.
2.1 Storage System Architecture
Figure 1 shows the typical architecture of a modern
storage system.
Shelf Enclosure 1
Disk
Storage Subsystem
Resilient Mechanism (RAID)
Storage Layer
(software protocol stack)
HBA
FC Cables
AC 
power
Fan
Backplane
Shelf Enclosure 2
HBA
Redundant 
Cables
Storage System
Figure 1. Storage system architecture.
From the customers’ perspective, a storage system is a
virtual device that is attached to customers’ systems and
providescustomerswith thedesiredstoragecapacitywith
high reliability, good performance, and ﬂexible manage-
ment.
Looking from inside, a storage system is composed
of storage subsystems, resiliency mechanisms, storage
head/controller,andotherhigher-levelsystemlayers. The
storage subsystem is the core part of a storage system
and providesconnectivity and usage of disks to the entire
storage system. It contains various components, includ-
ing disks, shelf enclosures, cables and host adapters, and
complex software protocol stacks. Shelf enclosures pro-
vide power supply, cooling service and prewired back-
plane for the disks mounted in them. Cables initiated
from host adapters connect one or multiple shelf enclo-
sures to the network. Each shelf enclosure can be option-
ally connectedto a secondarynetwork forredundancy. In
Section 4.3 we will show the impact of this redundancy
mechanism on failures of the storage subsystem.
Usually, on top of the storage subsystem, resiliency
mechanisms, such as RAID, are used to tolerate failures
in storage subsystems.
2.2 Terminology
We use the followings terms in this paper.
• Disk family: A particular disk product. The same
product may be offered in different capacities. For
example, “Seagate Cheetah 10k.7” is a disk family.
• Disk model: The combination of a disk family and
a particular disk capacity. For example, “Seagate
Cheetah 10k.7 300 GB” is a disk model. For disk
familyanddiskmodel,weusethesamenamingcon-
vention as in [2, 3].
• Failure types: Refers to the four types of storage
subsystem failures: disk failure, physical intercon-
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ure.
• Shelf enclosuremodel: A particularshelfenclosure
product. All shelf enclosure models studied in this
paper can host at most 14 disks.
• Storage subsystem failure: Refers to failures that
prevent the storage subsystem from providing stor-
age service to the whole storage system. However,
notall storagesubsystemfailuresareexperiencedby
customers, since some of the failurescan be handled
by resiliency mechanisms on top of storage subsys-
tems (e.g. RAID) and other mechanisms at higher
layers.
• Storage system class: Refers to the capability and
usageofstoragesystems. Therearefourstoragesys-
tem classes studied in this paper: near-line systems
(mainly used as secondary storage), low-end, mid-
range, and high-end (mainly used as primary stor-
age).
• Other terms in the paper are used as deﬁned by
SNIA [19].
Disk Drivers
SCSI Protocol 
FC Adapter w/ drivers
Disk
Storage 
Layer
Networks
Protocol
Stack
Figure 2. I/O request path in storage sub-
system
2.3 DeﬁnitionandClassiﬁcationofStorageSub-
system Failures
Figure 2 shows the steps and components that are in-
volved in fulﬁlling an I/O request in a storage subsystem.
AsshowninFigure2,forthestoragelayertofulﬁllanI/O
request, the I/O request will ﬁrst be processed and trans-
formed by protocols and then delivered to disks through
networks initiated by host adapters. Storage subsystem
failures are the failures that break the I/O request path,
and can be caused by hardware failures, software bugs,
and protocol incompatibilities along the path.
To better understand storage subsystem failures, we
partition them into four categories along the I/O request
path:
• Disk Failure: This type of failure is triggered by
failure mechanisms of disks. Imperfect media, me-
dia scratchescausedby looseparticles, rotationalvi-
bration, and many other factors internal to a disk
can lead to this type of failures. Sometimes, the
storage layer proactively fails disks based on statis-
tics collected by on-disk health monitoring mecha-
nisms (e.g., a disk has experienced too many sector
errors [1]. These incidences are also counted as disk
failures).
• Physical Interconnect Failure: This type of fail-
ure is triggered by errors in the networks connect-
ing disks and storage heads. It can be caused by
host adapter failures, broken cables, shelf enclosure
power outage, shelf backplanes errors, and/or er-
rors in shelf FC drivers. When physical interconnect
failures happen, affected disks appear to be missing
from the system.
• Protocol Failure: This type of failure is caused
by incompatibility between protocols in disk drivers
or shelf enclosures and storage heads and software
bugs in the disk drivers. When this type of failure
happens, disks are visible to the storage layer but
I/O requests are not correctly responded by disks.
• Performance Failure: This type of failure happens
when the storage layer detects that a disk cannot
serve I/O requests in a timely manner while none
of previous three types of failures are detected. It is
mainly caused by partial failures, such as unstable
connectivity or when disks are heavily loaded with
disk-level recovery (e.g., broken sector remapping).
The occurrences of these four types of failures are
recorded in logs collected by Network Appliance.
2.4 Data Sources
Table 1 provides an overview of the data used in this
study. Support logs from about 39,000 commercially de-
ployed storage systems in four system classes are used
for the results presented in this paper. There are totally
about 1,800,000 disks mounted in 155,000 shelf enclo-
sures. The disks are a combination of SATA and FC
disks. The population of disks contains at least 9 disk
families and 15 disk models. The storage logs used for
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Classes
Duration #S y s t e m s # Shelves Multipathing #D i s k s Disk
Types
# RAID
Groups
RAID
Types
# Failure Types # Failure
Events
Near-line
(Backup)
1/04 - 8/07 4,927 33,681 single path 520,776 SATA 67,227 RAID4
RAID6
Disk Failure
Physical Inter. Failure
Protocol Failure
Performance Failure
10,105
4,888
1,819
1,080
Low-end 1/04 - 8/07 22,031 37,260 single-path 264,983 FC 44,252 RAID4
RAID6
Disk Failure
Physical Inter. Failure
Protocol Failure
Performance Failure
3,230
4,338
1,021
1,235
Mid-range 1/04 - 8/07 7,154 52,621 single-path
dual-path
578,980 FC 77,831 RAID4
RAID6
Disk Failure
Physical Inter. Failure
Protocol Failure
Performance Failure
8,989
7,949
2,298
2,060
High-end 1/04 - 8/07 5,003 33,428 single-path
dual-path
454,684 FC 49,555 RAID4
RAID6
Disk Failure
Physical Inter. Failure
Protocol Failure
Performance Failure
8,240
7,395
1,576
153
Table 1. Overview of studied storage systems. Note that the “# Disks” given in the table is the number of disks that have ever been
installed in the system during the 44 months. For some systems, disks have been replaced during the period, and we account for that in our
analysis by calculating the life time of each individual disk. The “# Failure Events” given in the table are the numbers of the four types of
storage subsystem failures (disk failure, physical interconnect failure, protocol failure, and performance failure) that happened during the
period.
this study were collected between January 2004 and Au-
gust 2007.
Below we describe each storage system class.
Near-line systems are deployed as cost-efﬁcient
archival or backup storage systems. Less expensive
SATA disks are used in nearline systems. In nearline sys-
tems, one storage subsystem on average contains about 7
shelf enclosures and 98 disks. Both RAID4 and RAID6
are supported as resiliency mechanisms in nearline sys-
tems.
Primary storage systems, including low, mid, and
high-end systems, are mainly used in mission- or
business-critical environments and primarily use FC
disks. Low-end storage systems have embedded storage
heads with shelf enclosures, but external shelf enclosures
can be added. Mid-range and high-end systems use ex-
ternal shelves and are usually conﬁgured with more shelf
enclosures and disks than low-end systems. Each mid-
range system has about 7 shelf enclosures and 80 disks
(not every shelf is fully utilized and conﬁgured with 14
disks), and high-end systems are in similar scale. Going
from low to high-end systems, more reliable components
and more redundancy mechanisms are used. For exam-
ple, both mid-range and high-end systems support dual
paths for redundant connectivity.
2.5 Support Logs and Analysis
The storage systems studied in this paper have a low-
overhead logging mechanism that automatically records
informational and error events on each layer (software
and hardware) and each subsystem during operation.
Several recent works such as [2, 3] also studied the same
set of storage logs from different aspects.
Figure 3 shows a log example that reports a physical
interconnect failure. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, when a
failure happens, multiple events are generated as the fail-
ure propagates from lower layers to higher layers (Fibre
Channel to SCSI to RAID). By keeping track of events
generated by lower layers, higher layers can identify the
cause of events and tag the events with corresponding
failure types. In this example, the RAID layer, which is
right above the storage subsystem, generates a disk miss-
ing event, indicating a physical interconnect failure. In
this paper, we look at four types of events generated by
the RAID layer, corresponding to four categories of stor-
age subsystem failures.
Besides the events shown in the example, there are
many other events recorded in the logs. For example,
standarderrorreportsfromthe SCSI protocollayertell us
what failure mechanisms happen inside disks [18]. Disk
medium error messages from disk drivers provide infor-
mation about broken sectors [2]. Similarly, messages
from FC protocol and FC host adapter drivers report er-
rors that occur in FC networks and FC adapters.
It is important to notice that not all failures propagate
to the RAID layer, as some failures are recovered or tol-
erated by storage subsystems. For example, an intercon-
nectfailurecanberecoveredthroughretriesat SCSI layer
or be tolerated through multipathing. Therefore, storage
failures characterized as storage subsystem failure as a
whole are those errors exposed by storage subsystems to
the rest of the system.
As Figure 3 shows, each event is tagged with the time-
stamps when the failure is detected and with the ID of the
disk affected by the failure. Since all the storage systems
studied in this paper periodically send data veriﬁcation
requests to all disks as a proactive method to detect fail-
ures, the lag between the occurrence and the detection of
the failure is usually shorter than an hour.
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recordedin storage logs on a weekly basis. This informa-
tion is particularly important for understanding storage
subsystem reliability since it provides the insight into the
system parameters of storage subsystems. More specif-
ically, storage logs contain the information about hard-
ware components used in storage subsystems, such as
disk models and shelf enclosure models, and they also
contain the information about the layout of disks, such
as which disks are mounted in the same shelf enclosures,
and which disks are in the same RAID group. This in-
formation is used for analyzing statistical properties of
storage subsystem failures in Section 5.
3 Frequency of Storage Subsystem Failures
As we categorize storage subsystem failures into four
failuretypesbasedon theirrootcauses, a naturalquestion
is therefore what the relative frequency of each failure
type is. To answer this question, we study the storage
logs collected from 39,000 storage systems.
Figure 4(a) presents the breakdown of AFR for stor-
age subsystems based on failure types, for all four sys-
tem classes studied in this paper. Since one problematic
disk family, denoted as Disk H, has already been reported
in [2], for Figure 4(b) we exclude data from storage sub-
systems using Disk H, so that we can analyze the trend
without being skewed by one problematic disk family.
The discussion on Disk H is presented in Section 4.1.
Finding (1): In addition to disk failures (20-55%), phys-
ical interconnect failures make up a signiﬁcant part (27-
68%) of storage subsystem failures. Protocol failures and
performance failures both make up noticeable fractions.
Implications: Disk failures are not always a dominant
factorof storage subsystem failures, and a reliability study
for storage subsystems cannot only focus on disk failures.
Resilient mechanisms should target all failure types.
• Sun Jul 23 05:43:36 PDT [fci.device.timeout:error]: Adapter 8 encountered a 
device timeout on device 8.24
• Sun Jul 23 05:43:50 PDT [fci.adapter.reset:info]: Resetting Fibre Channel 
adapter 8.
• Sun Jul 23 05:43:50 PDT [scsi.cmd.abortedByHost:error]: Device 8.24: 
Command aborted by host adapter:
• Sun Jul 23 05:44:12 PDT [scsi.cmd.selectionTimeout:error]: Device 8.24: 
Adapter/target error: Targeted device did not respond to requested I/O. I/O 
will be retried.
• Sun Jul 23 05:44:22 PDT [scsi.cmd.noMorePaths:error]: Device 8.24: No 
more paths to device. All retries have failed.
• Sun Jul 23 05:46:22 PDT [raid.config.filesystem.disk.missing:info]: File 
system Disk 8.24 S/N [3EL03PAV00007111LR8W] is missing.
Figure3.Exampleofapieceoflogreporting
a physical interconnect failure.
As Figure 4(b) shows, across all system classes, disk
failures do not always dominate storage subsystem fail-
ures. For example, in low-end storage systems, the AFR
for storage subsystems is about 4.6%, while the AFR for
disks is only 0.9%, about 20% of overall AFR. On the
other hand, physical interconnect failures account for a
signiﬁcant fractionof storage subsystem failures, ranging
from 27% to 68%. The other two failure types, protocol
failures and performance failures, contribute to 5-10%
and 4-8% of storage subsystem failures, respectively.
Finding (2): For disks, near-line storage systems show
higher (1.9%) AFR than low-end storage systems (0.9%).
Butforthewholestoragesubsystem, near-linestoragesys-
tems show lower (3.4%) AFR than low-end storage sys-
tems (4.6%).
Implications: Disk failure rate is not indicative of the
storage subsystem failure rate.
Figure 4(b) also shows that near-line systems, which
mostly use SATA disks, experience about 1.9% AFR for
disks, while for low-end, mid-range, and high-end sys-
tems, which mostly use FC disks, the AFR for disks is
under 0.9%. This observation is consistent with the com-
mon belief that enterprise disks (FC) are more reliable
than near-line disks (SATA).
However, the AFR for storage subsystems does not
follow the same trend. Storage subsystem AFR of near-
line systems is about 3.4%, lower than that of low-end
systems (4.6%). This indicates that other factors, such
as shelf enclosure model and network conﬁgurations,
strongly affect storage subsystem reliability. The impacts
of these factors are examined in the next section.
Another interesting observation that can be seen in
Figure 4(b) is that for FC drives, the disk failure rate is
consistently below 1%, as published by disk drive manu-
facturers, while some previous works claim that the AFR
for disks is much higher [14, 16]. We believe that the
main reason for the discrepancy is that these studies look
at disk failures from different angles. Our study is from
a system’s perspective, as we extract disk failure events
from system logs, similar to disk drive manufacturers’
studies. On the other hand [14, 16], look at disk failures
froma user’sperspective. Since theirstudiesare basedon
disk replacement logs, they cannot identify the reasons
for disk replacement. As system administrators often re-
place disks when they observeunavailability of disks, the
disk replacement rates reported in these studies are ac-
tually close to the storage subsystem failure rate of this
paper.
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Figure 4. AFR for storage subsystems in four system classes and the breakdown based on
failure types.
4 Impact of System Parameters on Storage
Subsystem Failures
As we have seen above, storage subsystems of dif-
ferent system classes show different AFRs. While these
storagesubsystemsarearchitecturallysimilar,thecharac-
teristics of their components, like disks and shelves, and
their redundancy mechanisms, like multipathing, differ.
We now explore the impact of these factors on storage
subsystem failures.
4.1 Disk Model
The disk is the key componentof a storage subsystem;
therefore it is important to understand how disk models
affect storage subsystem failures. To understand the im-
pactofthe diskmodel,westudydatacollectedfromnear-
line, low-end, mid-range, and high-end systems.
Figure 5 shows the AFRs for storage subsystems from
4 system classes conﬁgured with 3 shelf enclosure mod-
els, 6 combinations in total (not every shelf enclosure
model works with all system classes). Since we ﬁnd that
the enclosure model also has a strong impact on storage
subsystem failures, we group data based on system class,
shelfenclosuremodel,anddiskmodelsothatwe cansep-
arately study the effects of these factors. In this section,
we mainly focus on disk model; shelf enclosure model
will be discussed in Section 4.2.
There are a total of 20 disk models used in these sys-
tems, and each disk model is denotedas family-type, with
the same convention as in [2]. For anonymization pur-
pose,asingleletterisusedtorepresentadiskfamily(e.g.,
Seagate Cheetah 10k.7), and type is a single number in-
dicating the disk’s capacity. The relative capacity within
a family is orderedby the number. Forexample,Disk A-2
is larger than A-1 and B-2 is larger than B-1.
Finding (3): Storagesubsystemsusingdisksfroma prob-
lematic disk family show much higher (2 times) AFR than
other storage subsystems.
Implications: Disk model is a critical factor to consider
for designing reliable storage subsystems.
We can see from Figure 5 (a)-(f) that for most storage
subsystems, AFR is about 2% - 4%. However, storage
subsystems using Disk H-1 and Disk H-2 show 3.9%-
8.3% AFR, higher than the average AFR by a factor of
two.
We know that Disk H-1 and Disk H-2 are problematic.
It is interesting to observe that not only disk failures but
also protocol failures and performance failures are neg-
atively affected by the problematic disks. The possible
reason is that as disks experience failures, corner-case
bugsintheprotocolstacks aremorelikelyto betriggered,
leading to more occurrences of protocol failures. At the
same time, some I/O requests cannot be served in time,
causing more performance failures.
Finding (4): Storage subsystems using disks from the
same disk models exhibit similar disk failure rates across
different system environments (different system class or
shelf enclosure models), but they show very differentstor-
age subsystem failure rates.
Implications: Factors other than disk models also heav-
ily affect storage subsystem failures, while they are not
revealed by disk failures.
As Figure5 shows, some disk modelsare used by stor-
age subsystems of multiple system classes, together with
various shelf enclosure models. For example, Disk A-2
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Figure 5. AFR for storage subsystems by disk models.
and Disk D-2 are used in low-end systems with differ-
ent shelf models and by mid-range and high-end systems
with the same shelf model.
As we can see from Figure 5, for the storage subsys-
tems using the same disk models, disk failure rates do not
change much. For example, disk AFR of Disk D-2 varies
from 0.6%to 0.77%with a standard deviationof 8%. For
all storage subsystems sharing the same disk models, the
average standard deviation of disk AFR is less than 11%.
Ontheotherhand,thestoragesubsystemAFRexhibits
strong variation. For example, AFR for storage subsys-
tems using Disk D-2 varies from 2.2% to 4.9%, with a
standard deviation of 127%. For all such storage subsys-
tems, the average standard deviation of storage subsys-
tem AFR is as high as 98%. This observation indicates
that storage subsystem AFR is strongly affected by fac-
tors other than disk model, while these factors do not af-
fect disk failures much.
Finding (5): The AFR for disks and storage subsystems
does not increase with disk size.
Implications: As disk capacity rapidly increases, stor-
age subsystems will not necessarily experience more disk
failures or storage subsystem failures.
We do not observe increasing disk failure rate or stor-
age subsystem failure rate with increasing disk capacity.
For example, as Figure 5 (e) shows, storage subsystems
using Disk D-2 show lower disk and storage subsystem
AFR than those using Disk D-1.
4.2 Shelf Enclosure Model
Shelf enclosures contain power supplies, cooling de-
vices, and prewired backplanes that carry power and I/O
bus signals to the disks mounted in them. Different shelf
enclosure models are different in design and have differ-
ent mechanisms for providing these services; therefore,
it is interesting to see how shelf enclosure model affects
storage subsystem failures.
In order to study the impact of the shelf enclosure
model,welookatthedatacollectedfromlow-endstorage
systems, since low-end systems use the same disk mod-
els with different shelf enclosure models, so that we can
study the effect of shelf enclosure models without infer-
ence from disk models.
Finding (6): The shelf enclosure model has a strong im-
pact on storage subsystem failures, and different shelf en-
closure models work better with different disk models.
Implications: To build a reliable storage subsystem,
hardware components other than disks (e.g., shelf enclo-
sure) should also be carefully selected. And due to com-
ponent interoperability issues, there might be a different
“best choice” for one component depending on the choice
of other components.
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Figure 6. AFR for storage subsystems of low-end storage systems by shelf enclosure models
using the same disk models (a subset of data from Figure 5). The error bars show 99.5%+
conﬁdence intervals for physical interconnect failures.
Figure 6 (a)-(d) shows AFR for storage subsystems
when conﬁgured with different shelf enclosure models
but the same disk models. As expected, shelf enclosure
model primarily impacts physical interconnect failures,
with little impact on other failure types, different from
disk model, which impacts all failure types.
To conﬁrm this observation, we tested the statistical
signiﬁcance using a T-test [15]. As Figure 6 (a) shows,
the physical interconnect failures with different shelf en-
closure models are quite different (2.66 ± 0.23% versus
2.18 ± 0.13%). A T-test shows that this is signiﬁcant
at the 99.5% conﬁdence interval, indicating that the hy-
pothesis that physical interconnect failures are impacted
by shelf enclosure models is very strongly supported by
the data. Figure 6(b)-(d) shows similar observations with
signiﬁcance at 99.5%, 99.9%, and 99.9% conﬁdence.
It is also interesting to observe that for different disk
models, differentshelf enclosure modelswork better. For
example,forDisk-A2,storagesubsystemsusingShelfEn-
closure B show better reliability than those using Shelf
Enclosure A, while for Disk-A3, Disk-D2,a n dDisk-D3,
Shelf Enclosure A is more reliable. Such observations
might be due to component interoperability issues be-
tween disks and shelf enclosures. This indicates that we
might not be able to make the best decision on selecting
the most reliable hardware components without evaluat-
ing the componentsfrom a system perspective and taking
the effect of interoperability into account.
4.3 Network Redundancy Mechanism
As we have seen, physical interconnect failures con-
tribute to a signiﬁcant fraction (27-68%) of storage sub-
system failures. Since physical interconnect failures are
mainly caused by network connectivity issues in storage
subsystems, it is important to understand the impact of
network redundancy mechanisms on storage subsystem
failures.
Forthemid-rangeandhigh-endsystemsstudiedinthis
paper, FC drivers support a network redundancy mecha-
nism, commonlycalled active/passive multipathing.T h i s
network redundancy mechanism connects shelves to two
independent FC networks, and redirects I/O requests
throughthe redundantFC network when one FC network
experiencesnetwork componentfailures (e.g., broken ca-
bles).
To study the effect of this network redundancy mech-
anism, we look at the data collected from mid-range
and high-end storage systems, and group them based on
whetherthenetworkredundancymechanismisturnedon.
As we observed from our data set, about 1/3 of storage
subsystems are utilizing the network redundancy mech-
anism, while the other 2/3 are not. We call these two
groupsof storagesubsystemsdualpathssystems andsin-
gle path systems, respectively. In our data set, there are
very few disk models used in both conﬁgurations; other
disk models are mainly used in either dual paths sys-
temsorsingle pathsystems. Therefore,we cannotfurther
breakdowntheresultsbasedondiskmodelsandshelfen-
closure models.
Finding (7): Storage subsystems conﬁgured with net-
work redundancy mechanisms experience much lower
(30-40% lower) AFR than other systems. AFR for physi-
cal interconnects is reduced by 50-60%.
Implications: Network redundancy mechanisms such as
multipathing can greatly improve the reliability of storage
subsystems.
Figure 7 (a) and (b) show the AFR for storage subsys-
temsinmid-rangeandhigh-endsystems, respectively. As
expected, secondary path reduces physical interconnect
failures by 50-60% (1.82 ± 0.04% versus 0.91 ± 0.09%
and 2.13 ± 0.07% versus 0.90 ± 0.06%), with little im-
pact on other failure types. Since physical interconnect
failure is just a subset of all storage subsystem failures,
AFR for storage subsystems is reduced by 30-40%. This
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Figure 7. AFR for storage subsystems broken down by the number of paths. The error bars
show 99.9% conﬁdence intervals for physical interconnect failures.
indicates that multipathing is an exceptionally good re-
dundancy mechanism that delivers reduction of failure
rates as promised. As we applied a T-test on these re-
sults, we found out that for both mid-range and high-end
systems the observation is signiﬁcant at the 99.9% con-
ﬁdence interval, indicating that the data strongly support
the hypothesis that physical interconnect failures are re-
duced by multipathing conﬁguration.
However,the observationalso tells us that there is still
further potential in network redundancy mechanism de-
signs. Forexample,giventhat the probabilityforone net-
work to fail is about 2%, the idealized probability fortwo
networks to both fail should be a few magnitudes lower
(about 0.04%). But the AFR we observe is far from the
ideal number.
One reason is that not only failures from networks
between shelves contribute to physical interconnect fail-
ures; other failures, such as shelf backplane errors, can
also lead to physical interconnect failures, while mul-
tipathing does not provide redundancy for shelf back-
plane. Another possible reason is that most modern host
adapterssupportmorethan oneport, and eachport can be
used as a “logical” host adapter. If two independent net-
works are initiated by two “logical” host adapters sharing
the same physical host adapter, a host adapter failure can
cause failures of both networks.
5 Statistical Properties of Storage Subsys-
tem Failures
An important aspect of storage subsystem failures is
their statistical properties. Understanding the statistical
properties such as failure distribution of modern storage
subsystems is necessary to build right testbed and fault
injection models to evaluate existing resiliency mecha-
Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk
Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk
Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk Disk
Shelf 1
Shelf 2
Shelf 3
RAID group 1 RAID group 2 RAID group 3
Figure 8. Disk layout in shelf enclosures
and RAID groups.
nisms and to develop better ones. For example, some
researchers have assumed a constant failure rate, which
meansan exponentiallydistributedtimebetweenfailures,
and that failures are independent, when calculating the
expected time to failure for a RAID [13].
Figure 8 illustrates how disks are laid out in stor-
age subsystems. As Figure 8 shows, multiple disks are
mountedin one shelf enclosureand share the coolingser-
vice, power supply, and intrashelf connectivity provided
by the shelf enclosure.
The ﬁgure also shows how disks are assigned to build
up RAID groups, which include both data disks and par-
ity disks containing redundant data. In order to prevent
shelf enclosure from being the single point of failures for
a whole RAID group, it is a commonpractice for a RAID
group to span disks from multiple shelf enclosures.
In this section, we will study the statistical property of
storage subsystem failures both from a shelf perspective
and from a RAID group perspective.
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Figure 9. Distribution of time between failures in about 155,000 shelves and 230,000 RAID
groups during 44 months.
5.1 Time Between Failures
Figure 9 (a) and (b) show the empirical cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of time between storage sub-
system failures from a shelf and from a RAID group, re-
spectively. To study the failure distributionfromdifferent
disks in the same shelf/RAID group, we ﬁltered out all
duplicate failures. Since we only know when the failures
are detected, instead ofwhen the failures occur,the CDFs
do not start from “zero” point. As all the storage subsys-
tems studied in this paper send data veriﬁcation requests
to all disks hourly, as a proactive method to detect fail-
ures, we expect a short lag (up to an hour) between the
occurrence and the detection of storage subsystem fail-
ures.
Finding (8): Physical interconnect failures, protocolfail-
ures,a n dperformance failures show much stronger tem-
poral locality (“bursty” pattern) than disk failures.
Implications: RAID-based resiliency mechanisms,
whicharedesignedforhandlingdisk failures, mightnotbe
effective in handling all storage subsystem failure types.
As can be seen in Figure 9 (a), overall storage sub-
system failures are very “bursty.” About 48% of overall
storage subsystem failures arrive at the same shelf within
10,000 seconds of the previous failure. As expected,
physical interconnect failures show the highest tempo-
ral locality, while even protocolfailures and performance
failuresshowstrongtemporallocality. Noneofthese fail-
ure types follows distributions commonly used in failure
theory,such as exponentialdistribution, Gamma distribu-
tion, or Weibull distribution.
On the other hand, disk failures show a much less
“bursty” pattern, and the Gamma distribution provides a
best ﬁt for disk failure.F o rdisk failures, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that disk failures follow the Gamma
distribution with the Chi-Square-Test at the signiﬁcance
level of 0.05.
Finding (9): Storage subsystem failures from a RAID
group exhibit lower temporal locality (less “bursty” pat-
tern) than failures from a shelf enclosure.
Implications: Spanning RAID groups across multiple
shelves is an effective way to reduce the probability for
multiple storage subsystem failures to happen during a
short period of time.
Aswementionedabove,it iscommonto builda RAID
group across multiple shelves, in order to prevent shelf
from being a single point of failure. As we found out
from the storage logs, a RAID group on average spans
about 3 shelves.
Figure 9 (b) shows the CDF of time between failures
from the same RAID group. Compared to Figure 9 (a),
failures are less “bursty.” About 30% of failures arrive
at the same RAID group within 10,000 seconds of the
previous failure, lower than 48% for failures from the
same shelf enclosure. For all failure types, the temporal
locality is reduced. This observation supports the com-
mon practice of building a RAID group across multiple
shelves and encourages storage system designers to dis-
tribute RAID groups more sparsely.
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group still exhibit strong temporal locality.
Implications: We need resiliency mechanisms that can
handle “bursty” failures.
However, Figure 9 (b) still shows strong temporal lo-
cality, since multiple shelves may share the same physi-
cal interconnect, and a network failure can still affect all
disks in the RAID group.
We repeated this analysis using data broken down by
system classes and shelf enclosure models. In all cases,
similar patterns and trends were observed.
5.2 Correlations Between Failures
Our analysis of the correlation between failures is
composed of two steps:
(1) Derive the theoretical failure probability model
based on the assumption that failures are indepen-
dent.
(2) Evaluate the assumption by comparing the theo-
retical probability against empirical results.
Next, we describe the statistical method we use for
deriving the theoretical failure probability model.
5.2.1 Statistical Method
We denotethe probabilityfora shelf enclosure(including
all mounted disks) to experience one failure during time
T as P(1) and denote the probability for it to experience
two failures during T as P(2).L e tf(t) specify the failure
probability at moment t.
Assume failures are independent, then we know that
P(1) =
 T
0
f(t)dt (1)
P(2) =
 T
t2
(
 t2
0
f(t1)dt1)dt2
=
1
2
(2 ∗
 T
t2
(
 t2
0
f(t1)dt1)dt2)
=
1
2
(
 T
0
f(t)dt)2 (2)
Therefore,
P(2) =
1
2
P(1)
2 (3)
and more generally(the proof is skipped due to limited
space),
P(N)=
1
N!
P(1)
N (4)
We can derive the same formula for RAID group fail-
ure probability by replacing shelf enclosure with RAID
group in the derivation above.
It is important to notice that the relation shown in
equation 3 is a variation of a more common form:
P(A1,A 2)=P(A1) ∗ P(A2) (5)
The main difference is that we do not care about the
order of failures in equation 3.
In the next section, we will compare this theoreti-
cally derived model against the empirical results col-
lected from storage logs.
5.2.2 Correlation Results
ToevaluatethetheoreticalrelationbetweenP(1)andP(2)
shownin equation3, we ﬁrst calculateempiricalP(1)and
empirical P(2) from storage logs. Empirical P(1) is the
percentage of shelves (RAID groups) that have experi-
enced exactly one failure during time T (we set T as one
year), and empirical P(2) is the percentage of the ones
that have experienced exactly two failures during time T.
Only storage systems that have been in the ﬁeld for one
year or more are considered.
Finding (11): For each failure type, storage subsystem
failures are not independent. After one failure, probability
of additional failures (of the same type) is higher.
Implications: The probability of storage subsystem fail-
ures depends on factors shared by all disks in the same
shelf enclosures (or RAID groups).
Figure 10 (a) shows the comparison between empiri-
cal P(2) and theoretical P(2), which is calculated based
on empirical P(1). As we can see in the ﬁgure, empirical
P(2) is higher than theoretical P(2). More speciﬁcally,
for disk failure, the observed empirical P(2) is higher
than theoretical P(2) by a factor of 6. For other types
of storage subsystem failures, the empirical probabilityis
higherthan the theoretical correspondencesby a factorof
10-25. Furthermore, T-tests conﬁrm that the theoretical
P(2)and the empirical P(2) are statistically differentwith
99.5% conﬁdence intervals.
This is a strong indication that, when a shelf experi-
ences a storage subsystem failure, the probability for it
to have another storage subsystem failure increases. In
another word, storage subsystem failures from the same
shelves are not independent.
Figure 10 (b) shows the similar trend for the failures
from the same RAID groups. Therefore, the same con-
clusion can be made for storage subsystem failures from
the same RAID groups.
Although in Figure 10 we set T to be one year, the
conclusionis general to differentvaluesofT.W eh a v es e t
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Figure 10. Comparison between theoretical model against empirical results. Theoretical P(2)
is calculated based on equation 3. The error bars show 99.5%+ conﬁdence intervals.
T to 3 months, 6 months, and 2 years, and also grouped
data based on other factors, such as system classes and
shelf enclosure models. In all cases, similar correlations
were observed.
5.2.3 Causes of Correlation
There are several reasons that can explain the correlation
between each type of storage subsystem failures.
The disk failure probabilitydepends on environmental
factors, such as temperature [4]. Disks in the same shelf
or the same RAID group are close to each other, shar-
ing the same room temperature. Furthermore, disks in
the same shelf are also sharing the cooling facility (e.g.,
fans)providedbytheshelf. Whenthemachineroomtem-
perature is above or below the normal range, all disks in
the same shelf and the same RAID groupmay experience
a higher than normal failure probability. Similarly, when
shelf cooling facility does not work properly, all disks in
the same shelf may have higher probability to fail.
Most physical interconnect components, such as host
adapters, cables, and FC terminators on the shelf, are
shared by disks in the same shelf or in the same RAID
group. When a physical interconnect component such as
a host adapter experiences transient hardware errors, all
disks in the same shelf or the same RAID group have a
higher than normal probability of physical interconnect
failures.
Similarly, drivers for disks in the same shelf or the
same RAID group are usually updated around the same
time. If a particular version is buggy or has compatibility
issues, all disks will have a higherprobability of protocol
failures.
6 Related Work
Disk failure characteristic studies There are generally
two categories of disk failure studies: vendor studies and
user experience studies.
For example, Seagate and Quantum study long-term
reliability characteristics through accelerated life tests of
small populations and collecting statistics from their re-
turn unit databases [4, 21]. Based on such tests, they
calculate the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and record it
in a disk speciﬁcation. For most of the disks, the spec-
iﬁed MTTF is typically more than one million hours,
equivalent to a lower than 1% annualized failure rate
(AFR), which is slightly lower than what we observed
(0.9-1.9%).
But vendor-speciﬁed MTTF is usually not what has
been experienced by users. A study explained how disk
manufactures and end customers can calculate MTTF in
different ways [7].
Motivated by this observation, recently researchers
havestudieddiskfailuresfroma user’sperspectivebyan-
alyzing disk replacement logs collected in the ﬁeld [14,
16]. Interestingly, they found disks are replaced much
more frequently (2-4 times) than vendor-speciﬁed AFRs.
More interestingly, [16] found that the time between
disks replacements in the same machine room does not
follow the exponential distribution and exhibits signiﬁ-
cant levels of correlation. This ﬁnding is consistent with
what we ﬁnd about the time between storage subsystem
failures in the same shelf and the same RAID group,
while we further found out that different failure types
show different statistical properties.
Additionally, some researchers analyzed the charac-
teristics of disk latent sector errors, which can potentially
lead to complete disk failures, using the data from Net-
FAST ’08: 6th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies USENIX Association 123work Appliance AutoSupport Database as in [2]. Based
on the same set of data, they furtherconducteda study on
data corruption in [3]. They found enterprise class (e.g.
FC) disks are more reliable than near-line (SATA) disks.
Similarly, we discovered that FC disks have lower AFR
(0.9%) compared to SATA disks (1.9%). However, we
also observedthat storage systems using FC disks are not
necessarily more reliable than those using SATA disks,
due to other component failures.
Some studies also look at the factors affecting disk
failurerate,suchas diskmodel,thenumberofdiskheads,
disk size, and environmental factors [2, 6, 14]. Similarly,
in this paper, we looked at factors affecting storage fail-
ure rate, and found out that some factors strongly affect-
ing storage failure rate have little impact on disk failure
rate.
System component failure studies Unfortunately,there
is little work published on analyzing the reliability of
storage system components. Early work [17] presented
a reliability analysis on disk array, and claimed that other
system components such as power supplies, HBAs, cool-
ing equipment, and cabling cannot be ignored when ana-
lyzing the reliability of a disk array. However, their study
was not based on real-world data. Instead, they estimated
reliability of disk array based on formula and datasheet-
speciﬁed MTTF of each components, assuming compo-
nent failures follow exponential distributions and failures
are independent.
One of the very few empirical studies on storage sys-
tem failures was presented in [20]. This paper presented
an analysis of hardware failures in their prototype stor-
age systems during 6 months. They found out that disks
are among the most reliable components in the system,
while SCSI components (physical interconnects in their
prototypes) generated a considerable number of failures.
These ﬁndings are consistent with our study. However,
limited by the scale of the study, their failure sample size
(limitedto16storagesystemsandafew hundredfailures)
is too small to study important characteristics of failures
such as failure distribution and failure correlations,norto
identify factors affecting storage system reliability. An-
other related empirical study looked at storage system
outages based on 4,400 system-year records, and cate-
gorized the outages based on their root causes [11]. Al-
though sharing the similar goal of categorizing failures,
our study looks into the details of the storage subsys-
tem failure, which is considered as one outage category
in[11]. Furthermore,ourstudyisbasedondataina much
larger scale (about 137,000 system-years).
Beyond storage systems, an analysis of Tandem sys-
tems found out that software errors are an increasing por-
tion of failures reported by customers [10]. Similarly, we
found that protocol stacks account for 5-10% of storage
subsystem failures.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a study of the real-world storage
subsystem failures, examining the contribution of differ-
ent failure types, the effect of some factors on failures,
and the statistical properties of failures.
Our study is based on support logs collected from
39,000 commercially deployed storage systems, which
contain about 1,800,000 disks mounted in about 155,000
shelf enclosures. The studied data cover a period of 44
months. The result of our study provides guidelines for
designing more reliable storage systems and developing
better resiliency mechanisms.
Although disks are the primary components of stor-
age subsystems and disk failures contribute to 20-55%
of storage subsystem failures, other components such as
physical interconnects and protocol stacks also account
for signiﬁcant percentages (27-68% and 5-10%, respec-
tively) of storage subsystem failures. The results clearly
show that the rest of storage subsystem components can-
not be ignored when designing a reliable storage system.
One way to improvestorage system reliability is to se-
lect more reliable components. As data suggests, storage
system reliability is highly dependenton both disk model
and shelf enclosure model. We also found out that there
might be a different “better” model for different storage
systems, dependingon other componentsused in the sys-
tems. Another way to improve reliability is to employ
redundancy mechanisms to tolerate component failures.
Onesuchmechanismstudiedinthepaperis multipathing,
which can reduce AFR for storage systems by 30-40%
when the number of paths is increased from one to two.
Storage system designers should also think about using
smaller shelves (fewer disks per shelf) but more shelves
in storage systems, since data indicates that spanning a
RAID group across multiple shelves can reduce the prob-
ability of “bursty” failures.
We also found out that storage subsystem failure and
individual storage subsystem failure type exhibit strong
self-correlations. In addition, these failures also exhibit
“bursty” patterns. These results motivate a revisit to re-
siliency mechanisms such as RAID that assume indepen-
dent failures.
Future work will compare the impact of different fail-
ure types and study how to design resiliency mechanisms
targetingindividualfailure types, giventhat differentfail-
ure types show different statistical properties. Another
future direction is to design storage failure prediction al-
gorithms based on component errors. We also want to
extend this study to other components of storage systems
beyond the storage subsystem.
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